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The general strike as a weapon of peace: British socialists, the labour 
movement and debating the means to avoid war before 1914 
 
From its founding congress in 1889, the supra-national socialist collective of the Second 
International had spread an anti-war and antimilitarism message. Undoubtedly a propaganda 
tactic to signal their distance from established governments, it also reflected the genuine 
internationalism of many in the movement.1 This message would become more pertinent and 
more forceful from the start of the twentieth century when tensions between European 
powers were rapidly growing and a wider discussion ensued about how war could be avoided. 
The supposed, and seemingly surprising, ‘collapse’ of the International in 1914 when war 
finally did break out has thus triggered much debate.2 The International had never spoken 
with one voice on the subject, and there was little agreement over how European socialists 
could combat militarism, over questions on war, and how impending conflict could be 
prevented.3 The possible courses of action open to the national groupings within the 
International were varied: including propaganda; parliamentary action; protest meetings and 
demonstrations, mobilizing the workers; economic boycott; and the general strike. All were 
debated within and without the International by socialists and non-socialists, but it is the 
                                                          
1 For a discussion of this message and its propaganda effects see Kevin J. Callahan, ‘“Performing inter-
nationalism” in Stuttgart in 1907: French and German socialist nationalism and the political culture of an 
International Socialist Congress’, International Review of Social History, 45 (2000), 51-87; Kevin J. Callahan, 
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seemingly most radical of the options, the general strike as a weapon of peace, that forms 
the focus here. 
 The avocation of the general strike as a means of avoiding war had been on the agenda 
at all congresses of the International since 1891. The congresses held in Stuttgart in 1907 and 
Copenhagen in 1910 saw particularly heated debates on this contentious proposal. At 
Stuttgart, Gustave Hervé, the vocal anti-militarist and leading French socialist, proposed the 
International should pass a resolution stipulating that all socialist parties must announce a 
general strike, or an armed insurrection if necessary, if war broke out. This contrasted with a 
German resolution on how socialists should combat the threat of war, which carefully avoided 
mentioning the means by which they could. These two resolutions highlighted real differences 
between the French and Germans, especially over the general strike, which the Germans 
rejected outright. They also suggested an interesting paradox: with reformist groupings 
supporting the most radical measure, while revolutionary Marxists took a cautionary 
approach. The final resolution decided on was a compromise that declared it was the duty of 
socialist parties ‘to coordinate and increase to the utmost the efforts of the working class 
against war’,  while offering no specifics as to how this would be achieved, only that they were 
to use the ‘means which seem to them most appropriate’. Such a compromise unsurprisingly 
failed to satisfy and this issue was again up for debate at Copenhagen. This time another 
Frenchman, Édouard Valliant, and the moderate Keir Hardie, endorsed by the Labour Party, 
would propose the strike. A similar debate ensued, with the German delegates eventually 
coming out victorious, for, as one member of the committee on militarism remarked, ‘the 
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Austrians and Germans come from the countries where militarism is strongest and therefore 
have the sad advantage of being experts on the question’.4  
 In the main, these debates at the International have dominated historians’ discussions 
of socialism, antimilitarism and the question of war. However, as Kevin Callahan has noted, 
the International was not a purely internationalist organization, but combined patriotism and 
international solidarity in what he has labelled ‘inter-nationalism’.5 Though conditioned by 
what was being said at these congresses, a debate, conditioned by national contexts, was also 
held away from them by the national groupings of the International and the wider movements 
they represented. These national responses, however, have featured much less in the 
literature on European socialists’ response to war and in the wider literature on responses to 
the growing nationalism and militarism of the Edwardian years. This is especially the case with 
the British socialist and labour movements, traditionally seen as a reformist and parochial 
section, with little to add to the debate and little to say on foreign policy more generally.6 
More recently, some work has sought to challenge some aspects of this interpretation. 
Important reinterpretations of Labour’s (including the Independent Labour Party’s) foreign 
policy, relationship to the International and their attitude to war more generally have been 
produced.7 Others, meanwhile, have offered reassessments of the views of some elements 
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within the socialist movement.8 Yet, the general strike as a weapon of peace has invariably 
featured as little more than a footnote in such reassessments, despite the widespread 
contemporary discussion that it evoked. In part, this is because the strike has been 
traditionally seen as the particular policy of one man, Keir Hardie, and at best one party, the 
Independent Labour Party (ILP), rather than the wider movement or the broader Labour 
Party. It also reflects the tendency to abstract the discussion of labour and socialist foreign 
policy from the wider domestic context that profoundly influenced the movement’s 
responses.   
 We must remember that this debate did not take place within a vacuum and this wider 
context adds to its significance. The ‘great labour unrest’ in the years before 1914, which saw 
an unprecedented number of strikes, yet also highlighted inter-union opposition and 
suggested organized labour ineffectiveness, and the growth of syndicalism, undoubtedly 
conditioned both support for and opposition to the general strike.9 It challenged the 
relationship between trade unions and Labour, itself riven by ideological differences, with the 
more radical socialist element remaining a minority, and limited by organizational 
weaknesses. Labour, while appeasing its broad membership, was also trying to establish itself 
as a parliamentary force. It thus needed to satisfy its socialist core with radical policies such 
as the strike, while allowing for internal opposition, especially from MPs who may have lost 
their seat if they advocated such a policy. The tensions of the Edwardian years also invoked 
broader discussion across the political spectrum, which socialists and the labour movement 
                                                          
8 Graham Johnson, Social Democratic Politics in Britain, 1881-1911 (Lampeter, 2002); Marcus Morris,’ From 
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both took from and informed. This was a complex picture, with militarism not simply the 
preserve of the right and pacifism or opposition to war not manifesting purely on the left.10 
Britain also had a relatively strong tradition of pacifism, especially within the Liberal Party and 
through religious non-conformism, which influenced many in their response to the tensions.11 
The debate on the general strike thus brought together disparate views that reflected wider 
reactions to the threat of war.  
This article, then, will examine more thoroughly the domestic response to the general 
strike, looking beyond just Hardie and the ILP and considering the advocates and critics in 
their domestic dialogue, illustrating how many in the movement responded to the threat of 
war. This dialogue is also instructive in a number of other ways. It highlights the necessary 
negotiation of Labour policy, through diverse interest groups, that has marked a key struggle 
for the party since its formation. It also demonstrates that this was further complicated by 
contemporary context. Indeed, this debate surrounding direct action came at a particularly 
contentious moment, which had ramifications in the post-war period. In this, continuity can 
be seen between pre-war and post-war Labour policy. A closer examination of the debate, 
moreover, challenges the central argument about Hardie’s motivation for pursuing the policy 
put forward by Douglas Newton in the one study that has discussed the general strike in 
detail.12 Though an immensely detailed study of British socialism and the struggle for peace, 
Newton tends to focus on the debate through the lens of the international discussions, 
concluding that the movement was generally indifferent to international affairs.13 For Newton 
                                                          
10 Matthew Johnson has examined the existence of both within the broad spectrum of Liberalism: Militarism 
and the British Left, 1911-1914 (London, 2013).  
11 See Martin Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain, 1914-45 (Oxford, 1980).  
12 Douglas Newton, British Labour, European Socialism and the Struggle for Peace 1889-1914 (Oxford, 1985).  




the pursuit of this policy was purely for its propaganda benefits: ‘there is some doubt … 
whether the advocates of an anti-war general strike within the ILP genuinely believed in the 
measure as a practical weapon’. Instead, they ‘believed in the strike as a spectre worth 
summoning forth in order to scare the ruling elites into the paths of peace’.14 This article, 
though, will highlight how many genuinely believed in the possibilities of the strike, doing so 
up until the moment war broke out and returning to it after war had ended.  
 
Calling for the strike 
British socialists, or at least those who kept abreast of the discussions at congresses of the 
International, were clearly aware from the 1890s that some continental socialists were 
promoting the general strike as a means to avoid war. Indeed, it is suggested that Hardie had 
first endorsed the concept as early as 1896 in the aftermath of the Jameson Raid.15 Yet, it 
would not be until the first Moroccan crisis in 1905 and 1906 that individuals from within the 
movement would publicly advocate the general strike as a weapon of peace. In response to 
the crisis, the Labour Leader, the newspaper of the ILP, called for ‘an international general 
strike which would speedily change the war-like tone of the aggressors. The workers can 
speedily stop war. Their means of defence lie not in lifting the sword, but in laying down the 
hammer and shovel’.16 Though initially this call was not taken up extensively within the party 
or the wider movement, given its radical nature, it evidently struck a chord with a sufficient 
number and the idea gradually gained more support. By January 1908, ILP support was 
                                                          
14 Newton, British, 258. In Demonstration Culture, Callahan argues something similar about the discussions 
within the International.  
15 Newton, British, 251-2. 
16 Labour Leader, 9 March 1906. 
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adequately widespread for them to move a resolution at the Labour Party conference that 
attacked growing militarism and urged the conference to examine ‘the question of 
formulating a policy of international action in the event of immediate danger or actual 
occurrence of war’.17 The resolution was clear evidence that many in the ILP now considered 
the general strike as an important weapon in the workers’ arsenal for avoiding war.  
 In part, this progression was a response to the escalating Anglo-German rivalry, the 
pervasive militarism that was casting an ever-larger shadow over European relations and the 
wider domestic debate. It was also a response to their fellow British socialists, in particular 
Robert Blatchford and H.M. Hyndman, who were very publicly professing their fears of the 
so-called ‘German menace’. Hyndman accused the Germans of ‘making ready for an invasion 
of this country’ and in preparation was ‘building a fleet strong enough to cover that critical 
military operation’. They did not want war but to ‘tell the truth because we wish our country 
to keep clear of war with Germany. Subterfuges and sham peace twaddle are dangerous on 
both sides of the North Sea’.18 Thus, Blatchford contended that ‘if we do not want war with 
Germany we must be strong enough to cause Germany to want peace’ and so called for 
increased armaments expenditure to bring about peace.19 For the Labour Leader, these 
‘extraordinary outbursts’ were unforgivable, declaring that ‘no more humiliating incident has 
disfigured the history of our movement’. Instead, they believed that peace ‘lies in the growth 
of the international solidarity of Labour’, not in peddling the arguments of arms 
manufacturers. As such, ‘had Mr Blatchford devoted his pen to a splendid appeal for a definite 
treaty between the Socialist and Labour movements of Britain, Germany, and France, 
                                                          
17 Newton, British, 253.  
18 Justice, 14 March 1908.  
19 Daily Mail, 16 December 1909. For a fuller discussion of these claims see Marcus Morris, ‘Peace, but not at 
any price: British socialists’ calls for peace on the eve of World War One’, in Lucy Bland and Richard Carr (eds.), 
Labour, Radicalism and World War One (Manchester, forthcoming). 
8 
 
pledging them to proclaim a general strike in case of war, he would have done a real service 
to the cause of Socialism’. 20   
As tensions continued to grow, especially during the naval scare of 1909, so did the 
numbers calling for the general strike and the force with which they were making their calls. 
Hardie, therefore, suggested to one ILP branch that ‘if the worst comes to the worst’ he would 
advocate a strike in the war industries in order to prevent war.21 Support for the general strike 
from within the ILP increased over the next year or so, while those advocates made a 
determined effort to convince the wider movement of the value of the idea. In part they were 
reacting to the belief that, in the words of Ramsay MacDonald, ‘the Labour Party must make 
itself the organ of the tendency in the nation which made for peace and internationalism’.22 
As part of those efforts, ILP head office issued a report on 24 May 1910 on militarism and the 
threat of impending war, which they intended to submit to the upcoming Copenhagen 
congress of the International. Its significance lay in the resolution that called on the workers 
of Europe ‘to lay down their tools on the first rumour of war’.23 The report demonstrates two 
important points. First, that contrary to the traditional assumptions about Labour’s limited 
desire to contribute to debate in the International, the ILP at least were hoping to directly 
influence it, even in the face of concerted opposition. Second, that the report represented 
the first definite proposal of the general strike as a weapon against war, while also clarifying 
the terms of its use. This was calling for the general strike not as a response to a declaration 
of war, interrupting mobilization, the provision of troops and their movement to the front, 
                                                          
20 Labour Leader, 14 August 1908.  
21 Newton, British, 253. 
22 Labour Leader, 3 February 1910.  
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but for the strike as a response to the rumour of war or any crisis preceding its outbreak. They 
were thus now starting to think about how to operationalize the strike. 
At Copenhagen, the discussion of the steps that could be taken to avoid war was 
heated, with the same paradoxical response from reformists and revolutionaries. Reacting to 
the debate on the general strike at the congress, the British section of the International 
Socialist Bureau (ISB), which effectively acted as the executive of the International, ‘decided 
upon inviting every affiliated organization [in Britain] to give an opinion’ on the matter.24 The 
reaction was mixed, as it had been over the previous years and would continue to be until the 
outbreak of war, with varied opinions for and against the strike as a weapon of peace given. 
Unsurprisingly, then, it remained the subject of debate at Labour Party and Social Democratic 
Party (SDP) conferences over the next couple of years.25 Reflecting the division within the 
movement, the next two Labour Party conferences at Leicester in 1911 and Birmingham in 
1912 came to different conclusions on the matter. At Leicester, the delegates voted against 
the adoption of the general strike, while at Birmingham it was adopted after being carefully 
steered through by the ILP leadership. A domestic dialogue had thus been ongoing for a 
number of years and did not die with the adoption of the general strike in 1912 (there would 
be no proposal at the 1913 conference), with the debate about the viability of the strike as a 
weapon of peace still ongoing at the outbreak of war.  
Support, then, had grown for the strike as a weapon of peace from within the Labour 
Party. This was neither purely a response to those pointing out the German threat and calling 
                                                          
24 London School of Economics Archives (hereafter LSE), ILP 6/12/1 – ISB (British Section), circular to affiliated 
organisations, n.d., ‘A Strike Against War’. 
25 The SDP was the oldest of Britain’s socialist organisations, starting life as the Social Democratic Federation in 
1884 and changing its name to the SDP in 1906, in turn forming the British Socialist Party in 1911. For its 
history, see Martin Crick, The History of the Social Democratic Federation (Keele, 1994).  
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for further arms to counter it, nor simply a reaction to the International’s discussions, nor was 
it just seen as a propaganda tool. To be sure, its advocates saw it as weapon of last resort, but 
that was not because of any question over its efficacy as a response to the current crisis and 
as a weapon of peace. Thus when the British section of the ISB solicited the opinions of the 
wider movement, they did so on the premise that ‘those who support an Anti-War Strike do 
not do so as an alternative to political action, but as supplemental to that action’. As such, it 
was ‘to be used as a last resort where political action is not yet sufficiently developed to 
prevent it’.26 In many ways, they were consciously playing down the proposal’s radicalness to 
encourage support from a reformist or more moderate membership. They were also painfully 
aware, as the effects of recent industrial strife had demonstrated, of just how little influence 
the movement, and especially socialists, actually had. Politically, their influence was limited 
too, with Labour’s third-party status. The general strike therefore gave the workers a direct 
way in which they could prevent national policy makers from taking Europe to war that 
overcame their relatively weak position. It thus made it an attractive measure, despite its 
radicalness, to moderate organisations like Labour, even if it paradoxically remained less 
attractive for revolutionary groups. 
The strategy, as we have seen, has been most closely associated with Keir Hardie and 
he was certainly its most vocal advocate, but he had support from most of the ILP leadership 
and from many others outside of the ILP. Hardie’s reasoning centred on a number of 
assumptions about the solidarity of European socialist parties and trades unions, the 
effectiveness of direct, collective action, and the views of the working classes of Europe. 
Hardie believed in the power of the International, seeing the fraternal links that bound its 
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member organisations together as a key bulwark to the war that would be against their 
interests.  This also reflected his sincerely-held internationalism. He thus commented that 
‘the meeting together of large numbers of men and women of different nationalities tend to 
rub off awkward corners and foster the true catholic spirit of International solidarity’.27 The 
Socialist Review expanded on such an understanding, arguing that the International ‘has now 
become the voice of the International movement in its struggle to find expression in every 
land’ and thus ‘the International has become the sole means of European peace now’.28 
Echoing such sentiments, the Labour Leader boasted after the Basle congress in 1912 that 
‘five hundred delegates were present, representing the organised working class of every 
country in Europe, but here no feeling of distrust or ill-will separated nation from nation’. 
Indeed, they went further, claiming that ‘whilst the Governments of Germany and Great-
Britain were holding their fleets in readiness for conflict, August Bebel and Keir Hardie were 
standing side by side to declare that the workers for whom they speak harbour no feeling of 
enmity towards each other’.29 Hardie even used the International as a thinly-veiled threat in 
the House of Commons, reminding the House during a debate on army and naval expenditure 
that ‘there are certain factors which should not be overlooked, and the Socialist and Labour 
movement is one of these’. He continued, outlining how ‘there are now 600 Socialist and 
Labour Members [of Parliament] in the different countries of Europe representing a voting 
strength of 9,051,000 voters’.30 
At the heart of Hardie’s and his fellow advocates’ belief in the International was its 
potential to be the facilitator of European-wide working-class action, which had the power to 
                                                          
27 Labour Leader, 2 June 1900.  
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29 Labour Leader, 28 November 1912.  
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bring nations to their knees. This, of course, was central to the general strike being an 
effective weapon of peace: ‘any joint action of this kind would obviously require that mutual 
confidence had been established amongst the organized workers of the countries affected’.31 
Hardie evidently presumed that it had, while he also assumed that direct and united working-
class action would guarantee peace. He argued that ‘if the warmongers in Germany and in 
this country knew beforehand that the working class of the two countries had come to an 
understanding, and would stand by it’, this would ‘compel them to submit to arbitration the 
points which would otherwise have been submitted to war’.32 Thus, he told parliament in 
1911 that ‘in the event of the scaremongers and warmongers embroiling any two nations, the 
working classes of these nations should make war impossible by declaring a strike the day war 
is declared’.33 Hardie also discussed the operational elements of the plan; for instance in a 
speech given in Dundee in 1910, he maintained that ‘if war was threatened the duty was 
incumbent on the working class to strike, stop work, stop supplies, stop the railways and 
shipping, and cease making the guns and materials of war’. He continued, ‘if they did that 
they would soon end war; the very threat of the possibility of such a strike would make 
statesmen pause before sanctioning its outbreak’.34 As the threat of war got ever closer, 
moreover, he advocated an earlier strike. Moving from a last resort once war had broken out, 
to action that must be taken when the rumour of war was abroad.  
The final assumptions that underpinned the calls for the general strike as a weapon of 
peace centred on why war would be in the workers’ worst interests and the conviction that 
the working classes of Europe did not want war. For Hardie, the key was to show that 
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‘militarism strengthens capitalism by perpetuating the fiction that there must be enmity and 
animosity between nations’. Instead, he argued that ‘international social democracy says no 
– that the interests of workers of all countries are identical – and demands co-operation and 
not war, fraternity, not military rivalry’.35 ‘War is ruinous to the workers’ cause’, he insisted, 
‘it stirs international bitterness and hate, mutilates and destroys young life, arrests social 
reform, and adds millions to taxation’.36 Therefore, British socialists’ duty was to ‘show the 
organised workers … that they have the power, if they have the will, to end it’. Indeed, ‘when 
the organised workers offer active and passive resistance to war, the world’s peace will be 
proclaimed’.37 Supporters of the strike argued that ‘international quarrels are the crimes of 
financiers and their Governments’ and that ‘in the competition for trade routes, ports, and 
the new fields of exploitation, the workers have no part’.38 War only served the interests of 
armaments firms and their shareholders.39  
This argument was augmented by a particular conception of the workers and what 
they would and would not do in the face of war. In many ways, Hardie and his fellow 
advocates of the general strike as a weapon of peace had a naïve and simple faith in the 
workers of Europe, their solidarity and the primacy of class over nation. Indeed, this faith 
seemed particularly naïve given the context of labour unrest that saw division among the 
workers and the organisations that supposedly represented them. In arguing for the general 
strike, labour and socialist figures simply did not believe that the exploited workers of Europe 
would blindly follow their masters into battle against their fellow workers in a fight that was 
                                                          
35 Keir Hardie, ‘Foreword’ in Harry Dubery, A Labour Case Against Conscription (London, 1913), 2.  
36 Labour Leader, 8 December 1911.  
37 Labour Leader, 2 February 1912.  
38 Labour Leader, 28 November 1912.  
39 Philip Snowden most forcefully argued this in parliament and then in print, see Dreadnoughts and Dividends: 
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not theirs. This was by no means a new idea in the movement. At the International’s 1896 
congress held in London it was declared that ‘between the workers of different nationalities 
there is absolutely no quarrel’.40 Hardie thus built on the traditions of the International when 
he justified the strike at the Labour Party conference in 1911. He suggested that ‘the German 
worker does not want to fight his English brother, and the English worker does not desire to 
fight his German brother’. In the face of war ‘the workers of the world would pledge their 
faith to each other that they would stop finding soldiers or producing war material till the war 
came to an end. Of this I am certain, that the workers of the world will agree to use all their 
power to prevent that greatest of all crimes – the sending out of a man to shoot his brother’.41 
Support for the general strike was not limited to just the leading socialists within the 
ILP, who in many ways were the minority, and voices from across the labour movement 
supported the idea. At a demonstration in London organised by the French Confédération 
générale du travail in 1911, for instance, Tom Mann, now a leading syndicalist, spoke from 
the platform to endorse the use of industrial action to avoid war.42 Support for (and 
opposition to) the strike could also be found in the non-aligned Daily Herald. George Lansbury 
justifying the paper’s establishment of the paper commented that ‘we want to have thrashed 
out in a perfectly friendly manner, those questions connected not only with the theory of the 
general strike, or the right to strike, but the fundamental utility of the general strike’.43 An 
editorial from 1914 summed up its position on the general strike when it declared that 
Europe’s unions ‘must strike against war’ and that though ‘the general strike has been 
declared over and over again to be as yet a dream … in the case of war, where the one vital 
                                                          
40 BL  Add MS 50680 ff.160-63 – ‘Authorised Programme: International Socialist Workers and Trade Union 
Congress, London, 1896’.  
41 Daily Express, 1 February 1911.  
42 Tom Mann, Memoirs (London, 1923), 280.  
43 Daily Herald, 16 April 1912.  
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necessity is means of communication, it is as simple as it will be efficacious’.44 Support for the 
strike also seems to have been particularly strong in certain localities. 
 In Bradford, for instance, both the local ILP branch, along with its newspaper, the 
Bradford Pioneer, and the trades council approved of this particular weapon of peace. The 
council confirmed ‘the proposal for a general stoppage of work in all countries, and further 
we urge upon all workers the necessity for making preparations for a simultaneous stoppage 
of work in those countries where war is threatened’.45 Douglas Newton has suggested that 
there was ‘sympathy for the idea of an anti-war strike among certain large and important 
trades councils’.46 In Derby, the trades council’s endorsement was justified in familiar ways: 
‘the workers were now realising the gravity and importance of the matter because they were 
recognising that war with all its horrors was always inimical to the interests of the working 
class’.47 In Exeter, meanwhile, a contributor to a local newspaper argued that though ‘such 
an idea may be declared to be of the Utopian order’, the strike’s strength was the feelings it 
would evoke, for ‘an enormous force is exercised by sentiment’.48 Simply put, there was real 
propaganda value to the proposal too, in demonstrating the power of the movement and in 
frightening the ruling elite into caution. Douglas Newton has suggested that most in the 
movement saw no further value to the proposal, but as illustrated here, many trusted its 
efficacy too, despite the on-going structural weaknesses of Labour and the wider movement. 
Nevertheless, the strike as a weapon of peace was certainly not supported by all, with the 
dialogue that ensued illustrative of the movement’s sense of its own weaknesses, the 
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46 Newton, British, 277.  
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operational challenges in the wake of recent labour unrest, the division over the direction of 
Labour policy and negotiation between different elements that it necessitated.  
  
Opposition to the strike 
The domestic dialogue was most in evidence at Labour Party conferences where supporters 
of the general strike, and it was invariably members of the ILP, attempted to get the measure 
adopted by the wider party. They received immediate and direct criticism from the labour 
movement, especially trade unions, which mirrored that of other British socialists, and from 
outside of the movement. In outlining this opposition, this section will highlight the different 
themes that reflected wider concerns, which united the critics of the general strike as a 
weapon of peace. A large amount of time was dedicated to the proposal at the Leicester 
conference in 1911, when the delegates were asked to confirm ‘a recommendation that the 
opinion of the “organised working-class movement of the world” be taken on the utility of 
the general strike as a means of preventing war’. However, as the Manchester Guardian 
noted, ‘the discussion really resolved itself into a controversy as to the desirability and 
practicability of the general strike’.49 The conference declined to court the opinion of the 
wider movement, the Labour Leader remarking that ‘the defeat by six votes … was an intense 
disappointment to Mr Hardie and his supporters’.50 Perhaps this was unsurprising given the 
relative radicalness of the proposal, the domestic labour unrest and the moderateness of 
many of those in attendance. Indeed, given that radicalness, it is testament to the genuine 
belief in the power of the general strike proposal that it was adopted and that its advocates 
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were able to win over enough of the proposal’s detractors. As such, part of its significance lay 
in the recurrence of the debate post war.51  
A number of objections were raised to the proposal from the various elements of 
Labour’s broad church. The most common criticism put forward concerned the practicability 
of the general strike. The MP, G.A. Roberts, contended that it was ‘an unpracticable [sic], 
undesirable, and unworthy thing for organised Labour to take up’. Tom Shaw, a local 
councillor from Colne, echoed his thoughts: ‘if you were well enough organised to call such a 
strike … you would never need to use it. While if you do not possess the power, all your talk 
about it is mere wind’. Such critics were highlighting the movement’s weaknesses, which 
advocates of the strike had seemingly ignored, perhaps not wanting to acknowledge their 
own minority positions. In short, if labour was sufficiently strong enough to arrange such a 
strike it could end the war by parliamentary means. Thus, in prioritising the development of 
the nascent Labour Party, and foreshadowing his reorganisation of the party in 1918, Arthur 
Henderson concluded that ‘to advocate such a policy in this country would divert attention 
from parliamentary action, in which we shall find the instrument for the social and economic 
salvation of the workers of this country’.52 Others questioned whether direct action was an 
appropriate response. ‘Mr Gordon (Bilston) said all strikes were foredoomed to failure by 
reason of the fact that trade unions were not nationally united’ as evident in recent events. 
It was a revolutionary act and ‘the acceptance of this resolution would tend to bring the British 
movement into discredit’.53 Others approached the issue from a different angle, Mr Jarvis, a 
delegate from Bristol, concluding that ‘I am not prepared to lay down all arms and to throw 
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myself into the arms of any one who may come along. I want some means of resistance. So 
long as people have arms to use against me I want to arms to use against them’.54 He thus 
perceived the strike to be a pacifist measure, an unwanted label. Given the electoral failures 
of ‘pacifist’ Labour candidates in the post-war years, this was strategically sensible. Such 
criticism was not just confined to the conference hall and was repeated at other times within 
the Labour Party. 
 J.B. Askew writing to Hardie accepted that ‘the general strike would be the most 
obvious method of avoiding the war danger – were it not that in most cases the government 
are in a position to make it appear that the war is an aggression on them and an attempt to 
destroy the independence of the country’. He continued, ‘a general strike can only succeed 
on the assumption that the workers can see through the aims of the government – can 
understand the hollowness of the capitalist patriotism – can see that there is nothing more 
than swindle and the hunt for profit’. He concluded that ‘if they don’t see that then I fear they 
will howl for war rather than the general strike’.55 Others took up this prescient concern. The 
Socialist Review wrote that ‘the call of battle is still the most irresistible and intoxicating of all 
political appeals, once the beacons of war have been set ablaze’.56 It concluded that ‘we must 
not rely upon a weapon which will not work at the last moment’.57 Norman Angell, 
meanwhile, in a letter to Hardie admitted that though he hoped the strike could work he felt 
compelled to ask that ‘if the General Strike can stop war, why does it not stop armaments, 
which are as serious in their result for the worker as war itself?’.58  
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 When summarising the discussion at Leicester, the Manchester Guardian concluded 
that generally the opponents of the general strike ‘represented the trade unionist element’.59 
The trade unions more generally seemed to be the group within the wider Labour Party most 
opposed to this weapon of peace, despite their centrality to its success. In this, historians 
have made comparisons with the European labour movement. Chris Wrigley has thus 
suggested that in his opposition Arthur Henderson, ‘like his German counterparts … was not 
willing for the trade union rank-and-file’s livelihoods to be put at risk by socialist idealism’.60 
Labour’s response to war would thus be a negotiated policy, as so much was in the pre-war 
years, which incorporated minority socialist views and often-opposed labourist concerns.   To 
emphasise the point, foreign trade unions offered their direct opposition to Hardie. The 
chairman of the Danish General Federation of Trade Unions suggesting that ‘we think it very 
dubious the propounded remedy will be seen to have any worth’. He believed that the ‘result 
would easy be that a few countries with solid organizations established the strike, while the 
productions of arms etc. was transferred to countries, where the organizations are weak’, 
namely Russia, and ‘the strike thus would be fully, or partially, fruitless’.61 More generally, 
though the Trades Union Council would initiate its own inquiry into the viability of the strike 
as a weapon of peace in 1913, Douglas Newton has highlighted how ‘the idea of a general 
strike had no mass of enthusiastic supporters within the British trade unions’ beyond a 
handful of trades councils. As one British socialist reflected, ‘we knew the matter would not 
interest the trade unionists as a whole and we were right’.62 The debate thus highlighted the 
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distance between the disparate labour and socialist movements in Britain and perhaps 
socialists’ over-inflated sense of place within those.  
 There was further criticism from within the wider socialist movement, especially from 
the rival and Marxist SDP. An article in the party’s newspaper, Justice, suggested that ‘ideally, 
no doubt, the way to prevent war would be by a general strike in both countries, carried out 
resolutely and simultaneously at the moment of outbreak’. However, it continued by noting 
that though ‘it is a great idea’ it was ‘not a great probability’. The article questioned whether 
‘the British working class is educated enough, organised enough, disciplined enough, or self-
sacrificing enough, to execute such a coup?’ It concluded that ‘every Socialist, in his heart, 
knows that it would not be so’.63 Of course, if socialists in the ILP had admitted this, it may 
have undermined their place within the wider Labour Party. Another article also supported 
the idea, but stated that ‘we do not say that a general strike in the event of war would be 
practicable at the present moment in any country in Europe’. The author did note the 
propaganda value of the proposal though, believing ‘that there is no reason against affirming 
the principle; and such an affirmation would in itself be of value in showing the workers the 
power for peace they might exercise by organised effort’.64 Other critics simply reiterated the 
belief that ‘a strike or insurrection is not possible’, lamenting that the workers were ‘unable 
to prevent war, just as they have not the power to make war’.65 Perhaps one of the SDP’s 
leading figures, Harry Quelch, put in most pithily, when he remarked that ‘I can call spirits 
from the vasty deep, but will they come when I do call them?’.66 As well as an apparent 
paradox at the International, then, there existed one within the British movement too. This 
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radical measure was rejected by the radical SDP, despite its adoption by more moderate 
figures.   
 Other factions from within the movement also outlined their opposition to the general 
strike as a weapon of peace. Robert Blatchford, unsurprisingly, did not believe such a policy 
would be effective. Thus he wrote in an article in the Daily Mail that the ‘theory of joint action 
by British and German Socialists for the prevention of war’ was one ‘of those harmless games 
with which some Labour statesmen amuse themselves on dull days’. He continued, arguing 
that ‘the main result of it would be to hamper our Fleet. The Germans would settle their strike 
in swift and summary fashion – by the arguments of “blood and iron”’.67 This stance was 
echoed in the pages of the Clarion. Alex Thompson commented that ‘in Britain many unions 
have condemned the plan and very few have endorsed it: this is in time of peace when heads 
are cool and pulses calm’ and so he questioned ‘how much support then would the proposal 
find at a time of Mafeking fever?’ This, Thompson felt, ‘fully justified those of us who have 
expressed scepticism as to the feasibility of this device’.68 Criticisms such as these, though, 
were not limited to labour and socialist movements, with the wider press also examining this 
weapon of peace.  
 As recent studies have demonstrated, war enthusiasm in the years leading up to the 
outbreak of war in 1914 was not as widespread as historians have traditionally suggested.69 
Many in Britain, including the majority of the nation’s media, did not want war, and were 
looking for ways to avoid what even the Daily Mail believed would be the ‘greatest 
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catastrophe in human history’.70 Indeed, the Manchester Guardian reported that ‘evidence 
grows that public opinion is becoming shocked and alarmed at the thought that this country 
could be dragged into the horrors of a general European war’ and that ‘there is no Jingo 
feeling, no war fever, in the country’.71 Despite the wider anti-war sentiment that prevailed 
in the period, especially from a relatively strong pacifist movement, and the campaign for the 
preservation of Britain’s neutrality, those outside of the movement did not see the strike as 
a viable option. Nevertheless, the fact that they discussed it, suggests that they did see it as a 
serious proposition, rather than merely a propaganda opportunity.  
 The starting point for criticism in the Spectator was the ‘persistence of patriotism’ in 
the International. In recording events at Copenhagen in 1910, the paper commented that ‘the 
project appeals to what at present is an unknown element – the extent to which Socialism is 
superseding patriotism as a motive of human action’. However, the discussion at the congress 
suggested to them that ‘we do not believe for a moment that patriotism is extinct in any 
European country’ and ‘at the outbreak of war it would be strong enough to make short work 
of such counsels as those of M. Valliant, M. Jaurés and Mr Keir Hardie we have no doubt at 
all’.72 A letter to the Spectator, meanwhile, focused on the possibility of the strike in Germany. 
The correspondent argued that ‘such a movement could be much more easily crushed in 
Germany, where most have been through the military mill, by the expedient of calling all the 
strikers to the colours – a call they could not resist without the most serious consequences – 
and once embodied the ‘roll of the drum’ would soon achieve the rest’.73 This perhaps 
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explains the paradox of German socialists’ rejection of the strike, despite its radical nature. 
The Daily Express kept it much more simple, labelling the general strike ‘a revolutionary and 
anti-patriotic proposal’.74 This was a powerful argument against socialists who had to 
constantly rebut charges of foreignness made against them.  
Such sentiments as these were also offered in the local press, showing how this debate 
mattered given the contemporary context. In Derby, for instance, it was noted that ‘in 
declaring a general strike they must be satisfied that the workers would respond’. However, 
instances were cited from the recent unrest where ‘the workers had not responded to the 
call in sectional strikes’ and the likelihood that they would in the case of war was questioned.75 
‘Plain Peter’ in the Devon and Exeter Daily Gazette wrote a particularly scathing article. The 
author condemned the strike as a weapon of peace from a number of angles. It was an 
‘impracticable proposition’, for ‘every working-man … knows that the “strike” as a mean of 
obtaining redress or better conditions, has failed lamentably, far oftener than not in the past’ 
and in this case would fail too. In attacking Hardie directly, the article continued stating that 
‘his solution, let me assure him, will not be approved by the working class of this country’. 
The reasoning behind this was simple, ‘we are still patriotic enough to fight for “England, 
Home and Beauty”, and no amount of Heir-Hardieism can divert a true-born Englishman from 
doing his duty when the day of duty comes’.76 Thus in this domestic dialogue, criticism came 
from disparate voices within and without the movement, yet tended to focus around the 
same themes.  
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 The criticism voiced more than any other centred on the practicability of the strike. 
Many felt that the strike as a weapon of redress was flawed in any situation, which the events 
of the ‘great labour unrest’ had merely emphasised. These critics felt that this would certainly 
be the case with the supra-national strike central to this proposal. Indeed, there was a 
question over whether the movement had the organizational ability to make this possible and 
when the strike would need to be called to be effective. As such, the reluctance of British 
trade unionists, their continental counterparts and European socialists was indicative of this 
problem and evidence for why it would not work. Could the advocates of the strike guarantee 
the universal participation of the Europe’s workers once war had broken out (or when it 
seemed only a possibility)? Indeed, many critics agreed that those campaigners would find it 
an impossible task to persuade the workers that war would not be in their interests. They 
believed, rightly as it turned out, that once war was declared duty, patriotism and nationalism 
would win out, and that the workers of Europe would rush to the colours in what would be 
presented as a defensive war, while the workers’ internationalism was rhetorical at best. 
Finally, many questioned whether the general strike was the best option for a reformist 
labour movement, suggesting that they would achieve more through parliamentary, rather 
than direct, action. Largely, it is these criticisms that were dominant in the domestic dialogue, 
but that did not mean that the strike’s supporters gave up in their campaign for its use as a 
weapon of peace.  
 
Continued campaigns 
Douglas Newton, as we have seen, has suggested that the general strike was adopted 
primarily for its propaganda benefits. To be sure, the adherents of the strike did recognise 
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this potential and undoubtedly welcomed it. Yet, those who were the keenest champions of 
the proposal were still calling for its implementation in the last few days of peace in early 
August 1914. Hardie and his supporters, despite rejection at the International would continue 
to regularly advocate the strike as a weapon of peace to both their party, the wider socialist 
movement and the British public more generally. This was most obvious on the pages of 
Labour Leader, which continued to adopt a pro-strike stance. Indeed, they were keen to stress 
their centrality to the plan, claiming that the ILP ‘has pioneered the proposal that the workers 
should lay down their tools when conflict is threatened’ and it was because of their work that 
‘the International are now taking the opinions of their affiliated organisations upon it’.77 
Though exaggerating their role, it demonstrated the strength of their support for the general 
strike, which was expressed beyond the movement too.  
 Some Labour MPs, for instance, raised the possibility of the strike in parliament when 
arms expenditure was discussed. Though others rejected it for fear that it might alienate their 
constituents. Many in the movement also continued to demand the use of the weapon from 
the platform. Thus, Hardie told an audience in Trafalgar Square in 1913 that ‘the working class 
of the two nations will take the issues of war and peace out of the hands of bankrupt 
statesmen, and, instead … will join hands and hearts, and upon a given day make war forever 
impossible by means … of the weapon of the general strike’.78 Indeed, there was debate 
within Labour as to how best to reinforce this message and effectively publicise the idea. At 
the 1913 annual conference of the Labour Party, therefore, a resolution was passed that 
called upon working-class wives and mothers to assist ‘by teaching their children the meaning 
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of the international solidarity of the workers’.79 Norman Angell, meanwhile, wrote to Hardie 
explaining that ‘I believe I could help this campaign … by making your speaking force really 
familiar with the answers to all the sophisms they are likely to meet’. For, he continued, ‘there 
is a very strong tendency … to depend upon anti-capitalist declamation, and not really answer 
those who talk about the needs of ‘defence’ at all’.80  
 As tensions grew in 1914, the message was presented ever more strongly and with 
increasing desperation. Moreover, this was not just contained to British shores, Kenneth 
Morgan illustrating how ‘throughout the early summer of 1914 Hardie was actively involved 
in negotiations with the International Socialist Bureau in pushing the concept of a general 
strike’.81 Nowhere was the strength of commitment to the strike more evident than in the 
Labour Leader. An article from 30 July saw their arguments put forward most vehemently, 
backing them up with grave warnings:  
The next few days will be critical for the peace of Europe, and Socialists of all countries 
should be up and acting … a very grave responsibility rests upon the Socialist and 
Labour movement of Europe at this moment. Our movement is the guardian of peace. 
It is fifty million strong, and if it will only act unitedly it can make war impossible … if 
the organised workers will demonstrate with sufficient force, a European war can be 
made impossible … We have the power to stop it … now is the time to strike this blow 
for peace. The delay of even a few days would be fatal.82 
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Such words were highly prophetic, with delay, indifference and inaction indeed proving fatal. 
Yet, Hardie would still continue to push the general strike. In a letter to the Daily Citizen on 1 
August, he noted that ‘I hold the opinion strongly that organised Labour has the power … to 
render war practically impossible. The threat of an international stoppage of work, provided 
it was backed by proper organisation and by mutual confidence, would of itself be sufficient 
for this purpose’.83 That he called this a ‘revolutionary moment’, though, may suggest one 
reason for its failure. In the movement’s last great stand against the war, meanwhile, a mass 
demonstration held on 2 August in Trafalgar Square, figures from across the movement were 
still arguing that war could be avoided by ‘a national war strike’, with such calls greeted by 
‘loud cheers’ according to the Daily Herald.84 So close to war, this was not about propaganda; 
the strike was seen as the last-remaining weapon of peace available to the workers of Europe.  
 The sincerity with which its advocates called for the strike is evident after 1918 when 
many in the movement returned to it in further periods of industrial militancy and political 
uncertainty. The general strike was raised as a possible response to military action in Ireland. 
Matthew Worley has shown, moreover, how direct action informed Labour Party discussions 
during 1919 and 1920, with serious plans made in August 1920 for a general strike alongside 
trade unions in opposition to British involvement in the Russia-Poland war. A national council 
of action was established in this ‘Hands off Russia’ campaign and 350 local councils were also 
created to co-ordinate action should it be needed.85 Though at a national level Labour stepped 
back from direct action, this did not preclude its future consideration. In 1933, for example, 
headlines announced that the ‘Labour Party demands general strike if war breaks out’.86 It 
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was discussed at the TUC the year after and by the Scottish TUC in 1935.87 Furthermore, in 
1936 the ILP adopted the resolution that be general strike would be called in the event of 
war.88 The pre-war calls for the strike, then, were neither meaningless rhetoric nor simply 
propaganda tools and there was clear continuity in the support for the strike between pre- 
and post-war Labour.  
 
The failure of the campaign for the strike 
That many in the movement continued to advocate the general strike as a weapon of peace 
until the moment of war and that it was formally adopted by the Labour Party should not 
distract us from the reality that support for the proposal remained limited to a minority and 
that its successful prosecution looked a remote possibility. This does not diminish the 
importance of the debate. Indeed, the factors that explain the more or less limited support in 
turn reveal much about the wider context in which the dialogue took place. At the heart of 
socialist division over how to respond to the growing tensions were domestic struggles, within 
the labour movement and external to it. The growing tension was something that domestic 
socialist rivals hoped to use to gain political capital over their opponents. Such desires equally 
conditioned the response of their opponents, and so though the SDP might be able to offer 
support in principle, they felt compelled to offer criticism too as part of any domestic 
dialogue. Coupled with this were socialists’ often-difficult relationships with trade unions, 
with many in labour highlighting division, mutual distrust and organizational limitations as 
fundamental flaws in the implementation of the strike.  
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 Much of the ultimate rejection of the strike results from the attitudes of the trade 
unions, which made it impossible to operationalize. As Chris Wrigley has suggested, ‘much of 
the British trade union movement was barely at ease with the ILP before 1914, let alone in 
sympathy with the SDF or continental Marxists’ and, as such, this was a significant episode in 
the long-running negotiation of policy between Labour and the unions.89 To persuade the 
predominately Liberal or even Conservative voting unions that continental workers’ interests 
were their interests too proved to be an impossible task. Duncan Tanner has thus gone as far 
as to claim that ‘many union leaders were emphatically patriotic, to the point, in some 
instances, of xenophobia’ and so socialist internationalism never appealed.90 It was no 
surprise, then, to see leading trade union leaders and MPs, such as Ben Tillett and Will Thorne, 
conducting recruitment campaigns once war broke out. The domestic dialogue discussed 
above suggests that such reservations were not just limited to the unions and that many in 
the labour and socialist movement were not convinced by such internationalist ideals.91 Thus 
their limited support for the strike may not have been a comment on its worth as a weapon, 
rather the lack of belief in the weapon’s ultimate aim, with peace not as universally desired 
as those advocating the idea supposed and the internationalism of the workers more rhetoric 
than reality. 
 Nevertheless, the efficacy of the strike was central to critics’ charges in the domestic 
dialogue and the lack of support for the general strike as a weapon of peace illustrates the 
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widely-held ambivalence towards the strike as an instrument of direct action.92 Hyndman 
summed up the feelings of many when he noted that ‘I have never known what I should call 
a successful strike’.93 Such a claim was all the more pertinent given the timing of the debate. 
With a mass wave of strikes across Britain happening simultaneously, the idea of a general 
strike was in effect tested. That the effectiveness of such strikes was uncertain in turn 
generated questions over the movement’s capability to launch such a strike and highlighted 
its organizational limitations, with many concluding that it was not a viable tactic for 
maintaining peace. That many socialists chose not to acknowledge these limitations tells us 
about their perception of the movement, their possible detachment from the majority and 
their desire to be seen as revolutionary even if they ultimately toed a moderate line. It also 
illustrates the challenges faced in the development of the Labour Party in the pre-war period, 
including its lack of unity and the need to appease a diverse supporter base, from 




The domestic dialogue that surrounded the general strike as a weapon of peace was no mere 
sideshow then in the years before the outbreak of war. It was a dialogue that extended 
beyond the movement, had important international dimensions, illustrates the attitudes of 
the British labour and socialist movement in the years preceding 1914 and the challenges 
                                                          
92 This was bound up with a wider debate on revolution versus reform within the movement, see Graham 
Johnson, ‘“Making reform the instrument of revolution”: British social democracy, 1881-1911’, The Historical 
Journal, 43 (2000), 977-1002.  
93 H.M. Hyndman, Further Reminiscences (London, 1912), 291.   
31 
 
facing a developing Labour Party. Clearly, it was more than just a propaganda exercise, still 
advocated in the days and hours before war was declared and re-emerging as a weapon after 
the war, but as a weapon of peace the general strike did not garner the support of either the 
majority of the movement in Britain or the International. This could be seen as an inevitable 
consequence of a European-wide proletariat caught up in this age of nationalism, adding 
weight to the argument that the ‘collapse’ of the International in 1914 was no surprise. Yet, 
the dialogue that took place in Britain suggests otherwise. This was not just an abstract debate 
that took place on the pages of the European socialist press and in the congress halls of the 
International. This was a debate held by all parts of the movement, in various arenas, 
including national parliaments. It was a serious proposition, debated as such, and thus should 
be given the same importance by historians.  
 In Britain and beyond there was a clear and genuine desire to avert war from within 
the labour and socialist movement and therefore an extensive discussion took place around 
the options open to them. With the realisation, perhaps, that their options were in reality 
limited. This debate was held outside the movement too, especially within the Liberal Party. 
In the years preceding war, the movement and the nation more generally were not simply 
swept up in a patriotic tide. Nevertheless, the general strike as a weapon of peace has 
invariably only been considered from the continental perspective and as one that was of only 
limited significance. However, there was an equally impassioned response in Britain. To be 
sure, it did not have the support of the majority, which was always unlikely given the 
dominance of the unions, but nor was it just backed by Hardie. The domestic debate thus 
reveals much about the British movement at a very particular moment in its development and 
the challenges it faced. The context is important and undoubtedly influenced the response to 
the strike, especially given that this was a moment of mass labour protest. From this we can 
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illustrate pre-war attitudes to direct action, perceptions of the state of the movement and 
the distance between socialist idealism and labourist realities.  
 The dialogue that took place over a decade or so preceding the outbreak of war is also 
important in helping us understand the decisions that Britain’s and Europe’s labour and 
socialist movements made in 1914 when war had been declared across the continent. Though 
the almost universal support for their nations’ war effort was extremely likely, this dialogue 
indicates why other options were not adopted and why that support, despite the calls for 
peace, seemed the most likely outcome. Revealed in the criticisms is a collective lack of faith 
in domestic movements and their capabilities, mutual mistrust between Europe’s socialists 
and trade unionists, and above all serious doubts over the internationalism of Europe’s 
workers. Moreover, if the domestic debate is compared with that in the International it 
highlights a supra-national movement at odds with itself and one where quite different 
systems required different responses as war loomed ever larger. In retrospect, the general 
strike as a weapon of peace may seem particularly naïve, and some contemporaries certainly 
saw it as this, though that should not take away from the very genuine faith that some had in 
this as the way to avoid not only war in 1914, but war altogether.  
 
